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Introduction
As the war in the Pacific drew to a close, air raids destroyed Tokyo, Yokohama, 
and nearly all other major cities.  Reconstruction began in earnest in the late 1940s 
with onset of the Cold War serving as a major stimulus for Japanese economic recov-
ery.  In addition to new ferro-concrete buildings, bridges and roads, cement was 
necessary for river and coastline repair, tetrapods, embankments and dams.  Al-
though Japanese cement production declined dramatically during the war years, the 
revival of the cement industry was initially slow.  It was only after the so-called “re-
verse course,” around 1948–49, that the Allied Occupation began to make compre-
hensive plans to rebuild the Japanese economy and undertake basic reconstruction 
of a country in ruins.  In 1949, controls on the production of basic industries, coal, 
iron, steel, and concrete were lifted; and after the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950, cement production began to rise dramatically.  By 1956, Japan produced 
13,737,594 tons of cement, double that of the prewar peak in 1939, and could boast 
the largest cement export industry in the world.  This paper narrates the rebirth of 
the Japanese cement and limestone mining industries in the period between 1945 
and 1956.  It examines the contribution of the Cold War, and the Korean War in 
particular, in reviving Japan’s cement industry.  The paper inquires into some of the 
colonial origins of Japan as a “construction state” and concludes with thoughts on 
the environmental impact and legacy of cement in Japan and the world today.
A Variety of Colonial Origins
In an earlier paper I looked at the development of Japan’s cement industry in 
Manchukuo.1)  During the 1930s, thousands of idealistic engineers, most connected 
with the Home Ministry, flocked to Manchukuo to construct the infrastructure of a 
modern state: roads, railroads, canals, ports, water works, and communications net-
works.  All of these projects required vast quantities of cement.  To that end state-of-
the art cement factories, one after the other, were set up in different parts of Man-
chukuo as branch factories of major cement producers in Japan, particularly Onoda 
and Asano.  After the war, many of these engineers returned to Japan and eventual-
ly became involved in the rebuilding a country that had been decimated by war. 
And, as in the case of Manchukuo, the revival of Japan’s cement industry was essen-
tial for national reconstruction.  Asano, Onoda and other major cement producers 
were able to draw on the Manchurian experience.  As a recent book on the history 
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of civil engineers and their experience in Manchukuo concludes, the “nation build-
ing” (kokudo tsukuri ) of postwar Japan was constructed on foundations laid by the 
“national building” of Manchukuo.2)
To this we may add another set of colonial origins.  After defeat and loss of em-
pire, Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers and primarily by the United States. 
The occupation lasted for seven years, from 1945 to1952.  Goals to democratize and 
demilitarize Japan did not initially include economic reconstruction.  Aside from so-
called “zaibatsu busting,” plans were made to re-locate remaining industrial infra-
structure to Japan’s former enemies as war reparations.  Some cement factories did 
resume production, but most of the cement produced was destined for use by the oc-
cupying forces; nearly 50 percent for the first three years was requisitioned by the 
occupation.3)  In the meanwhile, Japan remained in ruins.  The so-called “reverse 
course” changed occupation policy.  By 1948, American and Japanese officials initi-
ated plans to build up basic Japanese industries, including cement, designated as a 
“strategic industry” along with steel, oil, chemicals, and electricity.  Suddenly Japan 
was the recipient of American technology transfer, especially in areas related to stra-
tegic industries.  As Laura Hein has noted, “the decade from 1945 to 1955 was one 
of tremendous technological innovation … just at the point when the Japanese were 
in the market for new equipment and processes.” 4)  The physical reconstruction of 
Japan began in the wake of the Cold War and expanded dramatically during the very 
hot war in Korea–in 1950 and 1951, more than five years after incendiary bombs 
and atomic bombs had destroyed most of Japan’s urban infrastructure.  And, as with 
the construction of the Manchukuo, steel and cement were the building materials of 
choice for roads, bridges, buildings, ports, and communications and transportation 
Figure 1: Building State Highways in Manchukuo (postcard, author’s collection)
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systems.  Aided this time by the United States, prewar policies dedicated to “wealth 
and power,” or what Janis Mimura calls “techno-fascism,” resurfaced in sustained 
and comprehensive programs of national reconstruction.5)
Revival of Japan’s Cement Industry
The beginnings of the cement industry go back the bunmei kaika years of the 
1870s.  A model factory was set up by the government in 1874.  In the 1880s, private 
entrepreneurs developed the industry: Asano Cement and Onoda Cement were the 
two pioneers (they are now merged as Taiheiyo Cement, Japan’s largest cement man-
ufacturer).  The peak in prewar cement production was in 1940 at 6,048,499 metric 
tons.  At that time Japan ranked among the top five cement producing countries in 
the world, with a total of 38 cement factories within the country, and branch facto-
ries in Korea, Manchuria, and China.  The war years, however, exacted a heavy toll. 
In 1945, only slightly over 1 million tons were produced and in 1946, Japan’s first 
peacetime year, production further declined to 927,089 metric tons.  Some plants 
had been dismantled and sent to the Philippines as reparations.  All overseas pro-
duction facilities were lost and most homeland plants were in poor shape.  Moreover, 
industrial giants, such as Asano and Onoda, were targets of SCAP’s ambitious zai-
batsu busting program.  Onoda, for example, lost 60 percent of its assets including 
11 overseas plants and, divorced from the Mitsui zaibatsu, was downsized substan-
tially.6)  Asano Cement, while not one of the big four zaibatsu, was also a target for 
dismemberment.  On December 9, 1947, the reorganized company, Nihon Cement, 
was charged with the mission to help “reconstruct Japan as a peaceful and demo-
cratic nation.” The cement industry, and in turn, the physical reconstruction of Ja-
pan, struggled with an uncertain labor force and unstable supplies of coal and lime-
stone.  
Recovery was slow; indeed wartime controls over the manufacture of cement 
were replaced by occupation controls.  Even the so-called Dodge Line (the deflation-
ary policies imposed in 1949 to stimulate economic growth) failed even to stabilize 
the economy.7)  Cement production rose slightly, but the production of durable 
goods declined.  For the cement industry, substantial and sustained growth came 
only after January 1, 1950, when government and military controls over cement pro-
duction and limestone mining, in place since 1934, were finally eliminated.8)  Con-
trols over coal production and distribution were also lifted, thereby eliminating oth-
ers obstacles to increased cement production.  Cement factories saw this new age of 
free competition ( jiyu¯ kyo¯so¯ no jidai ) as a major turning point, especially as the new 
exchange rate (360 yen to the dollar) served to encourage exports of Japanese ce-
ment.  At the same time, extensive damage caused by Typhoon Kathleen (1947) and 
Kitty (1949), especially in densely populated areas of Tokyo, coupled with explosive 
population growth (Tokyo’s population swelled from 2.8 million in 1945 to over 5 
million in 1950), made the need for housing and urban reconstruction all the more 
urgent.
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Chart 1 Cement Production 1937–1957
Year Production 
(tons)
Exports Factories Kilns
1937 6,103,907 1,338,298 44 124
1938 5,924,813 972,189 47 129
1939 6,199,724 1,561,476 46 131
1940 6,074,543 429,415 39 117
1941 5,838,210 432,218 39 107
1942 4,356,023 165,950 38 100
1943 3,767,666 95,711 36 80
1944 2,960,150 15,076 32 72
1945 1,175,914 2,700 34 77
1946 927,240 0 36 81
1947 1,232,270 4,000 35 80
1948 1,842,657 140,114 34 80
1949 3,271,204 485,638 33 79
1950 4,451,104 696,541 33 80
1951 6,531,951 1,075,384 33 85
1952 7,095,743 950,625 35 90
1953 8,740,773 803,467 36 97
1954 10,640,319 915,172 37 108
1955 10,519,144 1,232,114 42 120
1956 12,969,000 2,122,000 43 152
1957 15,107,000 2,201,000 43 156
1961 Cement Annual (semento nenkan ), 57; SCAP, Cement Industry of Japan, 7.
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 added to the expectations.  As the 
Asahi reported on October 15, 1952, the special procurement system produced a wel-
come “cement boom” that served as a sort of guardian angle (keiki no kami ) over Ja-
pan’s economic recovery.9)  Indeed the war proved profitable for Japan, the one 
major non-combatant in the Korean War.  As Ryo¯ichi Miwa has noted, “The Korean 
War special procurement boom enabled Japan to sweep away the dark clouds of the 
‘Dodge depression.’”10)  After three years of a no growth policy and three years of 
failed attempts to stimulate production, in 1951 the mining and manufacturing in-
dustries, including cement, were suddenly able to surpass prewar levels.  Instead of 
the Dodge Line, it was the “three white product boom” (sanpaku keiki )–sugar, am-
monium sulfate (fertilizer), and cement–that led Japan out of its economic dol-
drums.  (PPT) As can be seen on Chart 1, cement production in 1949 stood at 3.2 
million tons; by 1951, production had doubled to 6.5 million tons, rising to 7 million 
tons in 1953, to 12.9 million tons in 1956, soaring to 15 million tons in 1957.11)
On the one hand special procurements meant demand for Japanese products, in-
cluding cement, necessary for the war effort.  At the same time, the war made ex-
port-led industrial growth possible.  Cement companies had long dreamed of profits 
from exports.  As Kasai Junpachi, the founder of Onoda Cement (1881, Japan’s first 
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private cement company), was fond of saying: “We must guard against imports and 
buying dirt from foreign countries; instead, it is the duty of our countrymen to en-
gage in trade with Shanghai and Hong Kong and thereby make profits by selling 
them our dirt.”12)  Cement exports expanded in the 1930s, primarily to Japan’s colo-
nies; but it was only after 1948 when SCAP and Japanese government officials be-
gan to encourage free trade that Kasai’s dream was realized.  In 1948 the Japan Ex-
port Corporation was founded and export by private corporations was allowed in 
1949.  One year later, the outbreak of the Korean War gave Japanese cement export-
ers competitive access to markets in Southeast Asia, India, and Australia.  On Feb-
ruary 18, 1950, for example, negotiations with the Philippines, Japan’s new-found 
ally in the Cold War, resulted in permission for Nihon Cement to export 14,000 tons 
of cement.13)  Orders continued to roll in.  Looking again at Chart 1, exports in 1948 
were a mere 140,000 tons; in 1949, tripled to 486,000 tons; nearly doubling in 1951 
to just over 1 million tons, and again by 1956 to over 2 million tons as which point 
Japan was the world’s largest exporter of cement.  The Japanese cement industry 
continued to expand in the 1960s.  The Suez crisis in 1957 increased Japan’s com-
parative advantage in Asian markets, and the damage caused by the Isewan Ty-
phoon (Typhoon Vera), the strongest and deadliest typhoon to hit the Japanese 
mainland, created opportunities and demand for further expansion of Japan’s ce-
ment industry.  Finally, there was a special category of “export” cement destined for 
Okinawa in the 1950s, for use by the American military to create the infrastructure 
for its permanent occupation of the islands.  
Rebuilding Japan–White Products at Work
After the war, several plans for the reconstruction of Tokyo and other burnt-out 
urban centers were advanced, but to no avail.  By 1950, little of Tokyo was rebuilt 
according to any sort of comprehensive scheme–and when the reconstruction of 
Tokyo and other major cities began thereafter, the only general principle in force 
was the near universal use of cement: building, roads, bridges, sewers, dams, river 
embankments, docks, sea walls, even cement telephone poles.  Chart 2 illustrates 
the major uses to which cement was put during the immediate postwar years: 1945–
1955.
As can be seen, from around 1950, aside from exports, close to 60 percent of ce-
ment produced was consumed by public works, construction, roads and bridges, and 
power supply–areas dominated by public spending.  (It is also interesting to note 
how little was spent on construction and public works during the first five years of 
the occupation).  This postwar reconstruction boom, sparked by the Korean War, es-
tablished (re-asserted?) a mode and structure of development that continues to char-
acterize Japan’s political economy: the so-called “Construction State” in which 
sometimes as much as 40 percent of the nation budget is devoted to construction 
(and, in turn, to the abundant use of cement).  Not surprisingly, the reconstruction 
boom began with little consideration of environmental consequences; moreover, the 
local interests were often secondary to the needs of the center (Tokyo).  Here too the 
postwar construction state (and its confidence in reshaping the environment to meet 
human needs) had multiple prewar origins.  Let’s look at some specific examples.
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Dams
In 1950, the Japanese government enacted a Comprehensive National Land De-
velopment Law (Kokudo So¯go¯ kaihatsu-ho¯), inspired by America’s depression era pub-
lic work projects including the TVA, as a starting point for massive infrastructure 
construction (rail, roads, seaports, airports, dams, and flood control).  A dam boom 
followed; between the early 1950s and 1990, over 1000 dams were built, making Ja-
pan one of the dammed countries in the world.14)  Of key importance was the con-
struction of multi-purpose dams that could aid flood control, food production, and 
electric power generation.  Japan’s first postwar large-scale development project was 
the construction of the Sakuma Dam on the Tenryu River, begun in 1952 and com-
pleted in 1956–at that time, the “the largest dam in the Orient,” and symbol of Ja-
pan’s national revival.15)  On the one hand, the dam derived from American New 
Deal thinking, especially the TVA dam projects of the late 1930s, and relied on 
American dam building technology and heavy machinery, including imported Cat-
erpillar buldozers.16)  At the same time, however, Japan’s postwar dams profited 
from mammoth colonial ”national land planning” projects in Korea and Manchu-
kuo, such as the Fergman Dam and the Sup’ung Dam (completed in 1944 as, at that 
time, “the largest dam in Asia” and symbol of the power of Japanese imperial rule). 
Aaron Moore describes how many Sup’ung Dam engineers returned to Japan and 
joined construction and electric power companies, and used their expertise in com-
pleting the Sakuma Dam in record time.17)  Naturally such projects required extraor-
dinary amounts of cement.  In 1956, for example, the Hazamu Gumi, the firm in 
charge of the construction of the Sakuma Dam, took advantage of its own Manchu-
rian experience, to pour some 5,180 cubic meters of cement per day–thus setting a 
new world record.18)  Other massive civil engineering projects included the Okutad-
Chart 2: Major Destinations of Cement Production, Prewar and Postwar 
Exports Power Roads Bridges Public Works Construction
36 924,839/16.9% 259,748/4.7% 323,546/5.9% 524,053/9.6% 1,312,411/25.9%
46 0.0% 12,997/1.6% 23,640/3.0% 19,343/2.4%
47 4,000/0.3% 62,819/5.2% 16,420/1.4% 19,280/1.6%
48 140,114/17.1% 133,076/7.9% 255,055/15.1% 304,486/18.0%
49 485,638/8.3% 140,932/5.0% 545,241/19.2% 365,034/12.9%
50 575,239/12.9% 208,784/4.7% 165,272/3.7% 722,015/16.2% 913,478/20.4%
51 1,075,348/16.4% 300,100/4.6% 214,853/3.3% 1,212,602/18.5% 1,789,482/27.3%
52 950,525/13/6% 473,548/6.8% 247.680/3.5% 1,227,080/17.5% 1,604,953/22.9%
53 803,467/9.2% 1,028,857/11.8% 356,967/4.1% 1,435,051/16.4% 2,003,678/23.0%
54 915,172/8.8% 1,091,296/10.4% 593,563/5.7% 2,075,220/19.1% 2,295,030/22.0%
55 1,232,114/11.9% 1,164,928/11.3% 540,806/5.2% 1,787,494/17.3% 2,081,493/20.2%
60 1,619,302/7.4% 1,223,081/5.6% 1,428,998/6.5% 3,298,624/10.1% 6,074,886/24.4%
65 1,531,280/4.6% 526,495/1.6% 1,993,056/6.1% 3,649,929/11.2% 6,263,179/19.1%
Source: Han and Takeda (2205), p.3; Japan Cement Annual, 1960, 1968.
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ami Dam in Niigata, begun 1953 completed in 1960 (even today Japan’s largest 
hydro-electric station), the Kurobe Dam in Toyama, begun in 1956 and completed 
in 1963 (even today Japan’s tallest dam at 183 meters), and the Ogo¯chi Dam in Oku-
tama, construction begun in 1936, halted in 1943, resumed in 1948, and completed 
in 1957; some 3 million cubic meters of cement were used in its construction.19)  In 
all cases, these showcase national reconstruction projects resulted in the displace-
ment of local peoples, the destruction of local environments, the devaluing of local 
economies–and electric power produced sent to the big cities.
Public Housing
Housing was a priority issue in urban reconstruction throughout Japan.  Over 4 
million homes, largely in urban centers, had been destroyed.  And yet, reconstruc-
tion was slow.  In Tokyo, for example, by 1948 only 6.8 percent of those areas burnt 
by repeated napalm bombing raids, had been rebuilt.  Millions of people lived in 
slum-like conditions.  From the late 1940s, housing developments composed of clus-
ters of multi-story concrete apartment buildings known as danchi, were built to help 
alleviate the housing crisis.  Early examples include the Takanawa apartment (1946) 
and the Toyama apartments (1949), but large scale building was hampered by diffi-
culty in obtaining sufficient quantities of cement.20)  After its establishment in 1955, 
the Japan Public Housing Corporation (now Urban Renaissance Agency) began a 
nation-wide program of construction that continued for more than twenty years. 
Concrete was the building material of choice.  Most danchi were four to fives stories 
high and composed of multiple units, sometimes up to 30 buildings, making up what 
Figure 2: Pouring Cement for the Construction of the Okutama (Ogochi) Dam 
(postcard, author’s collection)
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came to be called a “new town.” Other danchi became to spread upwards; the first of 
these was the 10-story Harumi Housing Apartment completed in 1958.21)  Looking 
back, the danchi seem cold and oppressive and are often described as “Soviet style 
public building blocks,” but in the 1950s, these were dream houses, offered “the life 
we longed for.”22)  Concrete was modern and progressive; the stainless steel sinks 
and flush toilets allowed an aspiring middle class to dream of a better future.  The 
“new towns” in fact had prewar roots: danchi prototype cement structures were de-
signed by architect Ichiura Ken in the early 1950s–based on his own prewar plans 
for standardized / rational public housing ( ju¯taka no go¯rika), as a member of the 1941 
Public Housing Commission ( Ju¯taku Eidan).  The use of cement was championed 
because its ready availability; nothing need to be imported, making cement not only 
practical but patriotic.
Roads, Bridges, and Expressways
In 1946, roughly 1 percent of Japan’s 900,000 kilometers of roads were paved. 
The occupation did little to improve the situation.  Ralph J. Watkins, an economist 
invited by he Japanese government for advice on highway modernization, reported 
in 1956: “The roads of Japan are incredibly bad.  No other industrial nation has so 
completely neglected its highway system.”23)  By the late 1950s, construction began 
on a vast system of national expressways, national toll roads, and metropolitan ex-
pressways.  Bridges and tunnels were built everywhere (and sometimes to no-
where)–concrete being the prime building material.  Despite Watkins’ involve-
ment, many of the engineers who worked on these postwar road construction 
projects, including Kaneko Masaki, Kishida Akira, Sakata Shizuo, Oshima Hideno-
Figure 3: Construction of Mure Danchi, Mitaka, 1956 (Courtesy of Tada Corporation)
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bu, Seto Masaaki, and Katahara Nobutaka, had their training in the prewar Home 
Ministry and in Manchukuo and other of Japan’s colonies where they given a rela-
tively free hand to experiment with new construction materials and techniques. 
Kaneko, for example, wrote a primer on cement roads in 1941 and was active in the 
early 1950s in road improvement and city planning in Yokohama.  His 1955 publica-
tion on “Concrete Road Pavement in Japan” (Waga kuni no semento konkurı¯to hoso¯ ni 
tsuite) along with Seto Masaaki’s 1943 text on “The Design and Construction of Au-
tomobile Expressways” ( Jido¯sha senyo¯do¯ro no sekkei) were essential reading for Japan’s 
postwar highway engineers.24)  Similar to the Shinkansen, the To¯mei Expressway 
has prewar roots.25)
Technology Transfers
As can be seen, many of these postwar construction projects began in the prewar 
period.  More particularly, the origins of Japan’s “construction state” ideology and 
planning may be found in the Manchukuo experiment.  Kishi Nobusuke, Japan’s 
prime minister between 1957 and 1960, was, after all, the former head of the Man-
chukuo Industrial Development Bureau that had produced a series of five-year com-
prehensive plans to modernize the new country’s infrastructure.  As a result, the ce-
ment industry in Manchukuo was among the most technically-advanced in the 
world–its quality surpassing that of domestic production.  The facilities themselves 
were lost to the Soviet Union, but, as we have seen, many workers and engineers re-
turned to help rebuild Japan’s domestic cement industry.  In addition to these areas 
of continuity with the prewar period, the Cold War alliance between Japan and the 
United States allowed new cement technologies (in many cases developed for mili-
tary purposes) to flow into postwar Japan.  In particular, the 1950s saw the introduc-
tion of dry process kilns, which allowed for greater efficiency and productivity.26) 
Ready mix concrete (nama-kon) was another innovation that added to the efficiency 
of concrete construction.  Tokyo Concrete’s Narihirabashi Factory began to deliver 
ready mix on November 15, 1949, inaugurating the “ready mix” era (nama-kon jid-
ai).27)  In 1958, 615,715 tons of ready mix was delivered to construction site; by 1968, 
this had risen dramatically to 12.4 million tons.28)
Limestone–Japan’s Most Abundant Mining Resource
As can be seen in Chart 3, in the postwar period, limestone mining experienced 
explosive growth alongside the cement industry.29)  The process to produce so-called 
Portland cement, the building material of the modern world, was developed in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.  It is produced by heating limestone (and other 
clay-like materials) in a kiln to temperatures over 1,400 degrees C.  This resulting 
clinker is then ground into a fine white powder.  In immediate postwar Japan, al-
though variable, about 1,777 kg of raw materials, including 1,250 kg of limestone, 
was required to produce one ton of cement.  (Coal consumption per ton varied from 
200 to 500 kg, depending on the quality of the coal).30)  Japan is often known as a 
country without significant natural resources, a so-called “have not country” (mo-
tazaru kuni).31)  In the case of limestone, however, Japan was and remains very much 
a moteru kuni–a country that haves.  According to estimates, Japan has recoverable 
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reserves of limestone amounting to around 380 billion tons.  There are more than 
200 limestone mines or quarries throughout Japan, from Hokkaido to Kyushu, the 
greatest activity overlapping with cement producing centers in the Kanto and in 
northern Kyushu.  Prewar mining was largely open cut; large machinery including 
steam shovels and conveyer belts were introduced on the late 1920s and 1930s, 
along with tunneling and the glory-hole method of transport chutes.  From the 
1950s, in response to increased demand, and deprived of the cheap labor available 
in prewar Japan (sometimes in the form of forced Chinese and Korean labors and 
POWs), new heavy machinery, including bulldozers, cranes, drilling and digging 
equipment, forklifts, and crushers, were introduced from the United States.  New 
quarrying techniques were also imported.  For example, the bench-cut method was 
introduced in 1955 and quickly spread throughout the industry; it was not pretty, but 
it was productive and allowed easy use of heavy machinery.  The prewar peak of 
limestone production was in 1941 at 13.1 million tons.  At war’s end, production had 
fallen to 4.5 tons but revived quickly after the beginning of the Cold War in 1948. 
The prewar peak was surpassed in 1951 with the production of 15.5 million tons, ris-
ing to 40 million tons in 1960, and 120 million tons in 1970 rising to over 160 mil-
lion tons in 1973.32)  Despite its importance and abundance, not much attention has 
been paid to limestone production.  Nonetheless, integral to Japan’s recovery and 
Figure 4: Ready Mix Cement: Contributing to National Construction
Source: Advertisement in Nihon semento nenkan, 1968.
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years of high growth, limestone was the foundation of Japan’s construction state. 
Limestone production kept pace with growing demands from the cement, steel, 
chemical and construction industries.  But like the cement it helped to produce, 
limestone has left a mixed legacy of creativity and entropy, imprisonment and liber-
ation, construction and destruction.  
Concluding Thoughts–A Mixed Legacy
Is cement ugly?  If this is cement’s only sin, then the world would be in much bet-
ter shape.  To be sure, Japan, is one of the most cemented covered nations in the 
world.  And, for no reason other than entropy, there is no end in sight.  The way to 
protect Japan’s seacoast from a giant tsunami like the one that hit northeastern Ja-
pan in 2011 seems to be more concrete: a 400 km seawall, 12 meter in height at 
some places.33)  But cement is also a major polluter, accounting even today for about 
five percent of global CO2 emissions.34)  Cement produces greenhouse gases both 
directly (burning of fossil fuels, often coal, used to heat kilns) and indirectly (lime-
stone, made of calcium carbonate, breaks down when heated into calcium oxide and 
CO2).  Recent advances in technology have made the cement industry cleaner, but 
not yet carbon neutral.  In postwar Japan, the cement industry, alongside Chisso 
Corporation in Minamata and the Daiichi Petrocemical Complex in Yokkaichi, con-
tributed mightily to Japan’s status, by the early 1960s, as one of the most polluted 
countries in the world.
Yes, cement is often an eyesore–it is the building material of mindless bureau-
crats and construction companies.  And yes, the making of cement and the mining 
of limestone are threats to the integrity of the natural environment.  But cement can 
also be creative, liberating, and even beautiful.  For postwar Japanese architects, in-
cluding Tange Kenzo¯, Maekawa Kunio, and O¯ taka Masato, cement allowed for the 
construction of a new Japan, liberated from the past.  As O¯ taka put it, “Concrete is 
our material.  (Konkurı¯to wa wareware no mono).” He continued: “Concrete is a materi-
Chart 3: Limestone and Cement Production, 1930–75 (in thousand ton units)
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al which comes out of Japan.  We don’t have to go to Manchuria or wherever, to get 
it, and we can’t afford American, we can’t afford sophisticated American goods.  We 
build with concrete.35)  Moreover, concrete was “manufactured from materials from 
the earth of the home islands and was created by the efforts of the people them-
selves,” making it the ideal material out of which to construct a new Japan stripped 
of its past.36)
Tange Kenzo¯ argued that concrete allowed for the creation of new traditions. 
Lacking access to more prestigious building materials in the immediate postwar pe-
riod, he and other architects determined to create a new national architecture based 
on “made in Japan” concrete–poured into wooden forms that imprinted the grain 
of the timber on its finished surface.  The new “Japan Style,” evident in Tange’s de-
sign for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (1955), came into common use in 
both monumental as well as domestic construction, including low-cost public hous-
ing (danchi).  Concrete, in effect, became a “natural material,” supplementing if not 
replacing wood as a key ingredient in Japanese architecture.37)
The point is that cement and limestone have left a mixed legacy of environmental 
liberation and destruction.  Cement-based construction, including housing, bridges, 
highways, and even sea walls have allowed the construction of a state in which peo-
ple can live in increased comfort and security.  And whether deemed ugly or beauti-
ful (or both), there is no going back.  As Adrian Forty has noted, cement’s “inde-
structibility is both one of its most valued, and at the same time most reviled 
features.”38)  The legacy of the “construction state” is also mixed; as with business 
Figure 5: The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (Tange Kenzo¯, architect), 1955.
©Kochi Prefecture, Ishimoto Yasuhiro Photo Center
97
and politics nearly everywhere, public good and private greed are often not far 
apart.  An examination of the history of the construction of the Japan’s construction 
state allows us (writ large) to learn from its failures as well from its successes.
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